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Abstract 
 
We frame IPO pricing as an efficiency problem for prospective issuers and explore the effect of 
connections formed via lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) contributions. We develop 
an approach of general application in finance, where relationships of influence are suspected. 
Rather than imposing a regression-based framework, we allow relationships to manifest themselves 
in a data-driven manner. Our analysis reveals nonlinearities between IPO pricing efficiency and the 
two contribution avenues (justifying the fully nonparametric treatment). We are able to uncover 
relationships separately according to business sector, which we interpret in terms of varied 
competitive environments. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2014, Google surpassed Goldman Sachs in both lobbying and PAC (Political Action 
Committee) contributions2. Given the bank’s historic ties with government, this news drew 
considerable attention from the press. However, Google had initiated its Washington strategy a 
decade earlier, just a few months before its IPO (Initial Public Offering) in August 2004. Likewise, 
other corporate issuers exert great effort to develop their political networks early, opting for a 
highly discretionary expense during a period of cash scarcity. While few would argue against the 
long-term benefits of staying in the good graces of politicians, this observed behavior begs the 
question of whether incremental benefits accrue from the decision to proceed to an IPO 
‘connected’.  
On balance, the odds of attaining a good pricing outcome rarely favor the issuer. The 
disparity in bargaining power versus the lead underwriter and the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 
(1965)) result in the systematic dwarfing of the IPO offer price by first aftermarket close. The 
economic implications are colossal: over the period 1980-2014 alone, a total of 8,060 U.S. issuers 
realized an average first-day return of 18.6%. In dollar terms, the amassing of $805.8 billion in 
equity capital entailed an opportunity cost of $149.8 billion3. 
A politically connected issuer may be at an advantage compared to other IPO issuers for 
several reasons. First, the firm is in less need of an underwriter’s reputation for the purpose of 
certification (Carter et al. (1998)). Shares of an issuer known for its political ties should be easier to 
sell, obviating much of the marketing burden. Indeed, the increased publicity accompanying elite 
clientele adds to an underwriter’s own reputational capital, so that prestige spillovers cease to be 
                                                 
2 According to data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-profit U.S. research group, during 2014 
Google spent $ 16,830,000 and $ 1,036,926 for lobbying and PAC contributions, respectively. Over the same period, 
Goldman Sachs was associated with a lobbying expenditure of $ 3,460,000 and PAC of $ 1,017,100. 
3 We rely for these estimates on data from Jay Ritter’s website. 
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unidirectional. Second, politically involved firms have been shown to enjoy preferential access to 
debt financing (Faccio (2006), Boubakri et al. (2008), Houston et al. (2014)) and so these issuers 
encounter neither time nor liquidity constraints but instead they can afford to withhold listing until a 
satisfactory valuation arises. Third, connections mitigate the ex ante uncertainty surrounding a 
firm’s intrinsic value by indicating a capability to extract economic rents or, at a minimum, 
protection against tail risk. This implicit assurance may replace a low offer price as a means of 
disseminating confidence in future prospects (c.f. signaling studies such as Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Welch (1989), Chemmanur (1993)).  
Intangible assets such as a firm’s political network are difficult to identify and cumbersome 
to model, with incremental information hidden in nonlinearities. We investigate a prospective 
issuer’s potential to retain a larger portion of the surplus value created at an IPO, using lobbying 
and PAC contributions as proxies for corporate political connections. However, the challenge lies in 
defining a setting that caters appropriately to the different types of connectedness that they lead to. 
In this respect, a method allowing relationships to manifest themselves in a data-driven manner 
would clearly be advantageous. Accordingly, we approach IPO pricing as a production problem to 
be treated in a fully nonparametric procedure. Central to this framing is issuers’ ability to minimize 
underpricing across a variety of settings. Our estimation strategy is twofold, with each stage 
offering solutions to shortcomings in the literature.   
First, prior to examining the influence of exogenous factors, we address the problem of 
comparability among IPO returns which stems from the fact that returns do not account for price 
levels4. Gondat-Larralde and James (2008, p.449) stress the absence of a theory both explaining 
                                                 
4 For example, consider two IPOs: IPO A with an offer price of $2 and an aftermarket close of $4; IPO B with an offer 
price of $10 and an aftermarket close of $20. Because both cases yield an initial return of 100%, the focus on 
underpricing conceals the disparity in absolute price appreciation (i.e. $2 and $10 for IPOs A and B, respectively) 
providing no information on whether the issue is ‘cheap’ or ‘expensive’. Consequently, in terms of relative performance 
assessment, each IPO misleadingly appears to be an appropriate benchmark for the other. 
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IPO underpricing in equilibrium conditions and determining the average differences of IPO returns 
on the observed scale. As a consequence, some researchers (inter alia Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990)) analyze IPO underpricing without taking into consideration the 
variation of the phenomenon while others pre-assume its existence (Loughran and Ritter (2002), 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005)). Unlike these studies, we introduce a method for establishing 
comparability without ascribing a direction (underpricing or other) a priori. This is a deterministic 
frontier approach utilizing the ratio of IPO offer price to first aftermarket close in order to construct 
non-parametric piece-wise surfaces over the sample. The aim is to envelop the data in the smallest 
or tightest fitting convex cone, whereby the upper boundary of the fit reveals the optimal practice 
(Kumar and Russell (2002)). In this case, the emerging empirical frontier is anchored in the best 
performing issuers, thus setting reliable benchmarks across the sample. For the purpose of the 
envelopment, we use the mathematical programming technique data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
which features widely in Operations Research (Charnes et al. (1978), Banker et al. (1984), Sherman 
(1984), Mahajan (1991), Duzakin and Duzakin (2007), Sueyoshi and Goto (2009), Demerjian et al. 
(2012)). Demonstrating its extension to IPOs, we develop efficiency scores measured as the output-
based distance from the top performers5 (IPOs that need to be emulated). On this relative basis, we 
quantify issuers’ ability to reduce underpricing across industries, eliminating the methodological 
challenges laid out in Gondat-Larralde and James (2008).   
Our second (and ultimate) task is to assess the effect of a firm’s political strategy on the 
estimated efficiency. Most relative nonparametric efficiency studies (also called two-stage DEA 
studies) in Operations Research derive efficiency levels in the first stage and, subsequently, employ 
a regression-type framework (Tobit, OLS models, etc.) in order to explain observed variations 
                                                 
5 The measurement of productive efficiency has been well-developed in the seminal works of Farrell (1957), Aigner and   
Chu (1968), Afriat (1972), Aigner et al. (1976), Färe and Lovell (1978),  Forsund et al. (1980) and Kopp (1981). 
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(dependent variable) based on the exogenous terms (control variables)6. However, this route 
imposes unrealistic assumptions on the data-generating process leading to biased results (Simar and 
Wilson (2011)). In order to avoid such misspecifications, we apply the probabilistic method of 
efficiency estimation (Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007)) alongside the latest developments (Bădin et 
al. (2012)) on the impact measurement of environmental factors. Consequently, we carry forward 
our second stage analysis in a completely nonparametric framework without relying on modeling 
assumptions which may not be supported by the data. This approach enables us to capture all 
potential nonlinearities in the relation between IPO returns and lobbying and PAC intensity. Apart 
from this benefit, the shift of focus from outcome prediction to efficiency evaluation renders our 
estimates immune to endogeneity7, a common source of bias in the IPO-return equation which can 
also arise from firms’ self-selection into political contributions.   
In order to conduct this work, we require a new and comprehensive database. We manually 
investigate U.S. IPO deals recorded in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database over the period 
from 1998 to 2014 for evidence of political contributions within the 12-month period prior to the 
issue day. This search involves scrutiny of two distinct sources. The data on PAC contributions 
come from the files of the Federal Election Commission, whereas for lobbying contributions we 
search the electronic archives of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). After merging the 
contributions databases with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data on aftermarket 
prices, we identify 379 unique IPOs which have exhibited either type of activity. These firms cover 
12 out of the 14 Thomson Reuters proprietary macro-level industry classifications. 
                                                 
6 Refer to Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011) for an excellent analysis of the relevant studies. 
7
Also, as in Black and Smith (2004) and Frölich (2008), nonparametric estimators overcome the problems associated 
with endogenous control variables and remain consistent in lieu of instrumental variables. 
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Our results do, indeed, reveal nonlinearities in the relationship of efficiency with the two 
contribution avenues (in itself justifying the fully nonparametric treatment) and, moreover, the 
relationship differs across business sectors. By and large, PAC contributions conform to their 
hypothesized role in reducing the amounts of money left on the table by prospective issuers. Market 
participants factor in direct, interpersonal relationships with policy makers. Evidence from lobbying 
contributions corroborates this conclusion. The majority of IPOs exhibiting efficiency take 
advantage of both lobbying and PAC contributions. Results for the complete dataset show lobbying 
versus IPO efficiency as an inverted “U”-shape which, however, changes to a “U”-shape when data 
are restricted to IPOs with positive returns that lie on the empirical frontier and are, therefore, 
efficient. The change in shape prompts a closer examination, combined with the thought that firms 
across the various economic sectors are likely to pursue heterogeneous political objectives. We 
compare Energy and Power, Financial, and Industrial sectors and find different (plausibly 
“strategically tailored”) spending. Lobbying contributions in Energy and Power account for a 
positive nonlinear effect on IPOs’ efficiency levels, whereas PAC money appears to erode value. 
This may be explained by a heavy regulatory framework demanding quality communication 
between those setting policy and those affected by it. The reverse is observed in the Industrial 
sector, from which we surmise that PAC campaigns, as a superior means for networking, cajole 
decision makers into government purchases and favorable appropriations from the Federal budget 
for the industry. The Financial sector, in contrast, barely shows an economically meaningful 
association of either lobbying or PAC with IPO efficiency levels, perhaps because it already exerts 
a political role by virtue of its centrality to the economy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the relevant 
literature and develops our main conjecture. Section III describes database assembly and illustrates 
the proposed methodology. The empirical analysis is in Section IV. Section V offers a discussion 
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and possible interpretations of key findings. We subject our results to additional robustness tests in 
Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II. Background and hypothesis development 
A. Proximity to politics as a value-adding element 
Political connections may be formed via sourcing managers and key executives who are 
well-connected themselves or through the corporate treasury for political contributions. 
International evidence traces connections from interpersonal networks into firm value. Fisman 
(2001), for example, documents the share price of connected firms in Indonesia swinging in line 
with news of President Suharto’s health. Faccio (2006), exploring the interplay of business and 
politics in 47 countries, lists benefits for organizations employing officials with an alleged political 
footprint. Specifically, connected firms are capable of maintaining larger market shares as well as 
bearing more leverage compared to their non-connected peers. An additional privilege comes in the 
form of systematic tax discounts. Notably, the greater the observed extent of connectedness, the 
more these features emerge. Faccio and Parsley (2009) follow the market reaction of firms 
headquartered in politicians’ hometowns in 36 countries subsequent to their unexpected death 
announcements and find a 1.7% decline in value across a wide spectrum of political and economic 
conditions, including the U.S. 
The bourgeoning Chinese IPO market, in conjunction with the high degree of 
interconnectedness between local businesses and the central government, has stimulated research on 
implications for newly listed equities. The limited underpricing of politically connected firms 
features in this literature. For instance, Fan et al. (2007) note the role of CEOs’ links with 
government as both an asset during the IPO day (exactly because of the constraining effect on 
return) and a liability significantly impairing firms’ growth and earnings prospects over the long-
run. In a similar spirit, Francis et al. (2009), using multiple proxies of political connections 
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(directors’ network, type of state ownership, and underwriter’s ability to attract revenue from state-
owned companies), corroborate the relationship with underpricing. Additionally, they associate 
connected issuers with larger P/E ratios and higher IPO offer prices so that proximity to politics 
emerges as a pivotal factor in raising greater amounts of capital. Of course, using the Chinese 
capital markets as laboratories for assessing the effect of political connections on IPO underpricing 
invites controversy. On the one hand, the peculiar economic model of China cripples the 
transferability of findings to a mature Western market setting. On the other, it may be argued that if 
the effect is capable of manifesting itself in spite of the constant demand for Chinese equities, then a 
stringent robustness test has already been fulfilled. 
U.S. evidence tracing connections that stem from political contributions also reports 
significant implications for firm value. Cooper et al. (2010) study the correlation of PAC 
contributions with the cross-section of future abnormal returns and document a positive association. 
Chen et al. (2015), substituting PAC data for lobbying, corroborate this relationship. In parallel, the 
authors complement market measures of performance with accounting elements such as net income 
and operating cash flow, thereby showing the effect permeates into firm fundamentals. The value-
enhancing element of contributions can equally manifest itself via the advancement of more 
dubious purposes. Thus, Yu and Yu (2011) attribute to firms remaining active in lobbying an 
interesting immunity from fraud detection. In particular, scrutiny by the relevant authorities lags by 
an average of 117 days while violators are 38% less likely to be held accountable for fraudulent 
actions in the first place. Similarly, Correia (2014) highlights the role of both lobbying and PAC 
contributions as powerful deterrents against SEC enforcement actions.  
 
B. Political connections in the process of going public 
Following the research of Stoll and Curley (1970) and Logue (1973) registering positive 
skewness of the IPO returns distribution, underpricing is frequently framed as a balance among 
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conflicting incentives of the principal IPO participants. With underpricing arising from 
informational asymmetries, firms may forego some of the wealth created at the IPO by setting a 
lower price in an attempt to mitigate ex ante uncertainty. This behavior conforms to a signaling 
model and differentiates quality firms from other issuers (Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch 
(1989), Chemmanur (1993), Jegadeesh et al. (1993)). In parallel with transmitting assurances 
matching their standing, issuers themselves require market feedback and predictions of demand. 
Sophisticated investors, mainly in the form of institutional investors, can be central in this respect. 
Therefore, a number of studies establish underpricing as a means of deferred compensation for 
information revelation (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991), Sherman and Titman (2002), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003)). Ritter and 
Welch (2002) speculate that IPO subscription may be used as a tool for exerting influence on 
politicians, though they do not provide further evidence.  
A politically involved issuer is equipped to reduce the uncertainty surrounding an IPO. The 
connections formed via political donations can structure a network which facilitates information 
flow such as the exchange of issuer-specific information for forecasts of demand and market 
sentiment. To the extent that proximity to politics evidences a firm’s capability to extract economic 
rents, there is less disagreement on the value of connected firms, thereby eliminating the need to 
signal quality via a low offer price. 
In parallel, political connections reinforce an issuer’s bargaining position in pricing 
negotiations with the lead underwriter. Rather than the issuer gaining benefits in prestige from the 
underwriter for legitimacy, this may be reversed; a feature especially desirable if the underwriters’ 
market structure conforms to a model of oligopolistic competition (Loughran and Ritter (2004), Liu 
and Ritter (2010)). The immediate prestige spillovers do not preclude long-run expectations of a 
recurring stream of revenue in the form of new issuance activity, business with the brokerage 
division and potential M&As. Conversely, connected firms have been associated with advantageous 
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access to alternative means of financing such as bank loans (Houston et al. (2014)). Attaching less 
urgency to the IPO funds, therefore, the issuer is able to negotiate a higher valuation. As a result, 
the underwriter is incentivized to exert greater effort to retain a connected client at a time when the 
latter is able to be selective.  
 
C. Lobbying and PAC: two distinct means for establishing connections 
Lobbying and PAC contributions constitute a firm’s primary vehicles for gaining access to 
the U.S. political system. To put this endeavor in perspective, 2014 saw a reported aggregate 
lobbying expenditure of $ 3.21 billion, whereas PAC contributions over the election cycle fell 
slightly short of $ 0.5 billion. The disparity in magnitudes is indicative of their different natures. 
Lobbying aims to sway politicians to interventions that advance corporate interests. This 
may equally translate into refraining from action in cases where the optimal outcome lies with the 
status quo (defensive lobbying). The process is more elaborate than an exchange of money for 
political favors and constitutes an important input in the making of politics. The Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) defines as a lobbying contact any oral or written interaction 
(inclusive of electronic communications) to an executive branch official or a legislative branch 
official made on behalf of a client with regard to the formulation, modification, or adoption of 
federal laws, executive orders, or government contracts, etc. As a communications endeavor, 
therefore, lobbying represents a valuable source of information for legislators, even more so for 
issues of an especially technical character. In-house or external specialists, commonly former 
Congress members themselves, spearhead the lobbying effort and attempt to pinpoint elements in 
proposed legislations which confer utility on more stakeholders (inclusive of the affected political 
constituencies) than the client firm. With the relevant research (see Leech et al. (2005), 
Baumgartner et al. (2011)) showing that salient issues demand frequent and targeted campaigns, 
corporate lobbying has more than doubled since 1998, the first year for which lobbying data are 
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available in databases following the LDA. In the absence of a legal cap, firms’ expenditures far 
exceed what is required for staff compensation and related overhead in order to cater to an 
increasing variety of incumbent politicians’ private expenses (e.g. travel expenses, meals and events 
organization). The cash flows are disclosed, at an aggregate level only, on standardized lobbying 
reports and identified by their subject matter, also designated as ‘lobby issue’. 
PAC are commonly formed by corporations and special interest groups in order to support 
or sabotage the election of a specific candidate. Revolving around legislators rather than the 
legislative process, PAC contributions offer a firm first-order connections with people in power. 
This element of directness differs from lobbying, where a firm derives connectedness through 
lobbyists’ proprietary networks and relinquishes it by termination of the campaign. Additionally, 
PAC impose substantial limitations on contribution size and donors’ identity. In particular, even 
though corporate cash is eligible to cover a PAC’s operating costs, contributions beyond the break-
even point should be sourced from third-party donors. To this end, firms routinely solicit financing 
from principal constituents such as directors, employees and their families and, given that no 
individual may exceed the legal ceiling of $5 thousand, mass participation becomes a matter of vital 
importance to a campaign’s success. 
Firms select between the two contribution types based on their competitive environment and 
organizational idiosyncrasy. Large establishments which often attract public scrutiny (and increased 
litigation costs) are strongly incentivized to craft legislation on a bill-to-bill basis. In this respect, 
lobbying is essential. As an added benefit, campaign costs are a smaller consideration since they 
can be spread over an extended asset base. Market concentration has also been shown to relate 
positively to lobbying (e.g., Zardkoohi (1985)); conceivably, the fewer the participants in an 
industry, the larger the portion of the anticipated benefits that accrue to the donor firm as opposed to 
free-riders. To the extent that firms emphasize proprietary rights protection and securing 
concessions on the development of novel technologies, R&D intensity is another plausible factor for 
 12
lobbying. Similarly, a heavy regulatory framework induces a firm to communicate its perspective to 
legislators. Conversely, PAC campaigns facilitate firms with a large percentage of unionized 
employees or a heavy reliance on government contracts as a superior means for networking and 
claiming favoritism on an interpersonal basis. Of course, this does not preclude the intrusion of non-
economic factors into the PAC decision such as fads, internal politics, social norms and peer 
demand. 
Lobbying may be framed as a conduit of information and PAC as an open reference for the 
entity transmitting this information, the two complementing one another (Langbein (1986), Wright 
(1990), Humphries (1991), Austen-Smith (1995), Milyo et al. (2000), Ansolabehere et al. (2002)). 
Langbein (1986) conducts surveys of legislators and their cabinets and finds that the former 
appropriate time to lobbyists according to the PAC intensity of their client firms. Milyo et al. (2000) 
go a step further by refuting altogether the influence potential of PAC. Instead, the authors reduce 
these campaigns to simple entry tickets for access and dialogue on an ad hoc basis. Formally, the 
symbiotic relationship is designated as the ‘access-influence’ hypothesis. Adhering to this framing, 
in developing the main conjecture in our study, we group both contribution types under the 
umbrella of political connections. 
 
III. Data and methodology 
Next, we describe the assembly of our database and how we construct a model in order to 
extract effects on IPOs without imposing a regression-based framework, allowing relationships 
(linear or otherwise) to arise from the data. 
 
A. Data 
Following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, databases are available covering lobbying 
activity from 1998. We retrieve the population of U.S. IPOs for the period January 1, 1998 to 
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December 31, 2014 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. In line with the majority of 
IPO studies, we exclude deals with an offer price smaller than $5 per share (penny stocks), reverse 
LBOs, limited partnerships, American depositary receipts (ADRs) and foreign-based firms whose 
shares may already trade in their home markets. We eliminate real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
closed-end funds, royalty trusts and other special purpose investment vehicles. For this purpose, we 
exclude all SIC codes within the interval 6723-6999, inclusively. Special caution is exercised to 
identify and eliminate IPOs which, while bypassing Thomson Reuters’ closed-end fund filter, still 
function in this manner. The last restriction involves corporate spin-offs; these IPOs have only 
recently acquired organizational autonomy from a mature and sizeable organization so that the 
reputation of the mother firm largely certifies the offering, alleviating a significant portion of the 
ex-ante uncertainty. These interventions leave us with a sample of 379 unique IPOs.  
The pricing data come from two distinct sources. While SDC is an excellent source for IPO 
offer prices, its coverage significantly deteriorates when it comes to aftermarket prices. For first 
trading day closes, we rely on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and match the two 
databases. The sources for political contributions similarly diverge. We manually search each IPO 
company in the electronic platform of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) for evidence of 
lobbying activity. CRP sources data straight from the semi-annual lobbying reports submitted to the 
secretary of the Senate’s Office of Republic Records (SORP). The PAC contributions are retrieved 
from the archives of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) where we reiterate the investigation 
for all IPOs in the sample. Notably, in cases of multiple lobbying or PAC activity, we consider the 
contributions exhibiting the closest time proximity to the issue date for plausibly dominating in 
value relevance over older cash flows. Thus, we assemble a new and comprehensive database of 
U.S. firms’ political standpoint at the time of their transition into the public domain. 
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B. Sample description 
Our dataset consists of 379 U.S. IPOs, 317 of which are underpriced and 62 are overpriced 
(refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics and IPO identification by sector). In order to reinforce the 
robustness of our results, we seek in all of the analyses separate evidence from both the full and 
underpriced samples. 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics and IPO sample description 
Our sample consists of 379 U.S. IPOs for the period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2014 extracted from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. IPOs with an offer price smaller than $ 5 per share (penny stocks), reverse 
leveraged buyouts, limited partnerships, American depositary receipts (ADRs), foreign-based firms, real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), closed-end funds, royalty trusts and other special purpose investment vehicles are excluded 
from the sample. The issuing firms have been manually investigated in the electronic platform of the Center for 
Responsive Politics and the archives of the Federal Election Commission for evidence of lobbying and PAC 
contributions, respectively. All figures are in 12/2014 U.S. dollars. We rely on the SDC database for IPO offer prices, 
whereas aftermarket prices are sourced from CRSP. The lower part of the table distributes the IPOs across the 12 (out of 
14) Thomson Reuters’ proprietary macro-level industry classifications which we have been able to associate with 
political expenditure. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
      
Offer price 17.29 16.00 8.81 5.00 97.00 
1st close 21.56 18.11 18.55 5.00 280.00 
Lobby money  279,268 80,000 788,021 0.00 9,570,000 
PAC money 26,292 0.00 84,326 0.00 780,000 
N Percentage 
(%) 
   
High Technology 78 21 
Healthcare 72 19 
Financials 49 13 
Energy and Power 27 7 
Materials 27 7 
Industrials 33 9 
Consumer Products & Services 27 7 
Media and Entertainment 17 4 
Retail 14 4 
Real Estate 3 1 
Telecommunications 21 6 
Consumer Staples 11 3 
Total 379 100 
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Figure 1 presents an overview of the percentages of total lobbying and PAC activity on a 
sectoral basis. In particular, subfigure 1a reveals that companies from the Energy and Power, 
Telecommunications, Industrials and Financials sectors account for the highest percentages of 
lobbying. Similarly, subfigure 1b indicates that the largest PAC donations come from companies 
operating within the sectors of Energy and Power, Industrials, Financials and Media and 
Entertainment. Conclusively, the Energy and Power, Industrials and Financials sectors allow almost 
equally for lobbying and PAC. However, preferences towards either spending manner can exist. For 
example, the Media and Entertainment sector donates primarily PAC money, whereas the 
Telecommunications sector is more heavily involved into lobbying. 
 
Figure 1 
Distribution of lobby and PAC money per sector 
Subfigure 1a presents the per sector percentages of lobbying contributions made by 379 U.S. IPO firms over the 
period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2014. Subfigure 1b presents the respective percentages for PAC money.  
 
a
Lobby Money
7%
18%
14%
8%
4%
15%
6%
7%
2%
3%
16%
Consumer Products and Services
Energy and Power
Financials
Healthcare
High Technology
Industrials
Materials
Media and Entertainment
Real Estate
Retail
Telecommunications
 
 16
b
PAC Money
4%
21%
19%
6%4%
18%
8%
12%
0%2%
6%
Consumer Products and Services
Energy and Power
Financials
Healthcare
High Technology
Industrials
Materials
Media and Entertainment
Real Estate
Retail
Telecommunications
 
 
C. Methodology 
1. The model 
Suppose that an issuer’s ability to evaluate an IPO can be characterised by the pairs of the 
first aftermarket closing price pe
+
∈ℜ and the IPO offer price qb
+
∈ℜ . Then the process of the 
issuer’s evaluation of the IPO can be characterised by the activity set Ω  which is the support of the 
density of ( ),E B defined as: 
(1)    ( ) ( ){ }, , 0 ,p q EBe b f e b++Ω = ∈ℜ >  
where 
EB
f  is the joint density of ( ),E B with the probability function EBH defined as: 
(2)       ( ) ( ), , .EBH e b P E e B b= ≤ ≥  
From (1) and (2) we may then write: 
(3)     ( ) ( ){ }, , 0 ,p q EBe b H e b++Ω = ∈ℜ >  
and therefore from (3) we assume free disposability of Ω . Then for any e such that ( ) 0P E e≤ > ,  
(4)     ( ) ( ) ( ), ,EB EB EH e b H b e F e=  
where ( ) ( )
B E
H b e P B b E e= ≥ ≤  and ( ) ( )EF e P E e= ≤ .Then Ω can be defined as: 
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(5)     ( ) ( ){ }, 0 .p q B Ee b H b e++Ω = ∈ℜ >  
Given that the objective of an issuer is to reduce underpricing, we can determine the issuer’s 
performance in evaluating an IPO at price levels ( )0 0,e b  following Farrell (1957) as: 
(6)    ( ) ( ){ }0 0 0 0, sup 0 0 .B Ee b H b eφ φ φ= > >  
Finally, the empirical version of 
B E
H can be stated as: 
(7)    ( )
( )
( )
1
1
,
ˆ .
n
i ii
B E n
ii
I E e B b
H b e
I E e
=
=
≤ ≥
=
≤
∑
∑
 
In the spirit of other studies (Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), Jeong et al. (2010), Bădin et al. 
(2012)), let lobbying and PAC money be denoted by rM ∈ℜ which are the 
environmental/exogenous factors influencing the issuer’s evaluation process. Given that 
0
M m= , 
then the conditional process of an issuer’s evaluation of an IPO 
0
m
Ω is characterised as: 
(8)   ( ) ( ){ }
0
0,
, , 0 ,
p q
m E B M
e b f e b m+
+
Ω = ∈ℜ >  
where ( )
,
,
E B M
f e b m is the conditional density of ( ),E B given M m= . Then, 
(9)   ( ) ( )
,
, , ,
B E M
H b e m P B b E e M m= ≥ ≤ =  
And so 
0
m
Ω can be represented as: 
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0
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Then the issuer’s conditional efficiency score of IPO evaluation ( )0 0 0, ,e b m  is defined as: 
(11) ( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,
, sup 0 , sup 0 , 0 .
m B E M
e b m b e H b e mφ φ φ φ φ= > ∈Ω = > >  
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2. The empirical estimation 
 2.1 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
Grounded in the ideas of Farrell (1957), data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a linear 
programming formulation that describes a correspondence between multiple inputs and outputs. 
Unlike a production function which is defined by an equation, the DEA’s envelope is data-driven. 
That is, DEA (and not the researcher) determines which input-output combinations are efficient and 
thereby shape the efficient frontier. Following the work of Charnes et al. (1978), DEA has been 
applied in operations management (see Banker et al. (1984), Sherman (1984), Mahajan (1991)) but 
is largely absent from the finance literature. Some traces can be found in Varian (1990) who argues 
for a nonparametric approach when measuring the optimal performance of customers, investors and 
other economic agents. Assigning a lesser priority to statistical significance, Varian holds that the 
economic significance of a deviation from the optimal behavior entails more relevance. Employing 
a set of variables (quantities demanded, price and output), he develops metrics relying on residuals 
which capture the difference of outputs over inputs. Seiford and Thrall (1990) rely on these 
measures in order to draw a direct link with efficiency scores derived from DEA.  
In IPO research, DEA estimation remains in its infancy, which comes as a surprise given the 
perennial quest in this literature to overcome endogeneity concerns within the underpricing 
equation. The sole extant study is from Kooli (2006); however, with a theoretical framing that 
focuses on investors’ ability to maximize realized returns on IPO shares, Kooli overlooks the big 
picture which rests upon the excessive amounts of capital foregone at listing - the decision making 
units are indicative, with the offer price, number of shares and IPO proceeds comprising the inputs, 
whereas the first aftermarket price and quarterly return are outputs.  
 Our approach, in contrast, investigates IPO performance from the issuer’s perspective. 
Given that IPOs are underpriced (Ritter (1991), Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
Lowry et al. (2010)), the performance of an issuer can be evaluated on the basis that the 
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phenomenon of underpricing is reduced. We can, therefore, apply the nonparametric methodology 
of DEA in order to measure the efficiency of the issuer’s ability to evaluate better an IPO by leaving 
less money on the table. Figure 2 presents schematically two theoretical frontiers under the constant 
returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions.8 The horizontal axis 
indicates the stock price at close of offer and the vertical one relates to the offer price. Consider four 
IPOs at points C, B, L and H. The frontier under the assumption of CRS (VRS) is represented by 
the straight solid (dashed) line. As it can be easily observed, under the assumption of CRS only the 
IPO at point B is efficient in maximizing the offer price under the stock price at close of offer (i.e. 
minimizing the underpricing effect). However, when the assumption alters to VRS, the IPOs at 
points C, B, and L are regarded as efficient. In both regimes, the IPO at point H remains inefficient; 
under the CRS assumption its efficiency relates to the distance from the observed data point to the 
CRS frontier and is equal to the ratio of GF/GH. Alternatively, as per the VRS assumption, its 
efficiency is given by GL/GH. Therefore, in our analysis we need to estimate these distances under 
the two different technologies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
The CRS assumption is the most common economic assumption and has greater discriminative power compared to the 
VRS assumption (Zelenyuk and Zelenyuk (2014)). In our case, CRS suggests that a proportionate increase in e results 
in the same proportionate increase inb . However, under the more flexible assumption of VRS, a frontier may also 
exhibit increasing and decreasing returns to scale in different regions. Since our sample contains U.S. IPOs from 
companies operating in different sectors and in different time periods, scale effects can be present and may mask the 
estimated efficiency levels. Therefore, this study measures IPO efficiency under both the CRS and VRS assumptions. 
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Figure2 
Graphical representation of the theoretical frontiers  
The solid line presents the IPOs’ theoretical frontier under CRS. The dashed line presents the IPOs’ theoretical 
frontier under VRS. The black dots indicated by the letters C, B, L and H refer to the theoretical positions of 
hypothetical IPOs. The letters F and G represent distance points.  
 
 
 
 
 
In order to estimate the radial distances presented in Figure 2, we follow the estimators 
introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) by implying the CRS assumption ( )CRSφ and, subsequently, the 
estimators introduced by Banker et al. (1984) implying the VRS ( )VRSφ
 . Both estimators enable us 
to calculate the model presented in (6) and can be expressed as:   
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2.2  Second stage analysis  
 Subsequently, in order to incorporate the effect of political donations into our measurement 
(equation 11), we need to adopt smoothing techniques. Therefore, let ( )0 ,I m h be the indices 
defined as ( ) { }0 0, / 2iI m h i M m h= − ≤ . The empirical version of ( ), ,B E MH ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ can be estimated as: 
(14)     ( )
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where h is bandwidth applied using the procedure described by Bădin et al. (2010) and based on the 
least squares cross-validation data driven method (Hall et al. (2004)). The IPO performance from 
the issuers’ point of view taking into consideration the influence of lobby and PAC money can then 
be written as: 
(15)  ( )
( )( )0 0
0 0 0 0 0
, ,
ˆ , sup 0 , , 0 ,
CRS i i i i i
i I m h i I m h
e b m e E b Bφ φ γ φ γ γ
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Clearly, the LPs presented in equations 12, 13, 25 and 26 suggest that the IPO efficiency 
scores are measured on the basis that we try to maximize the IPO offer price given the stock price at 
close of offer. The above estimators are also called output-oriented DEA models. The choice of 
orientation is crucial and relies on the pre-investigation of those parameters/variables that the 
decision maker has greater control over (Coelli et al. (2005)). Since we study IPO performance 
from the issuer’s perspective, the decision maker (that is the issuer) can determine to a larger extent 
the IPO offer price rather than the stock price at close of offer. Accordingly, the above LPs 
minimize underpricing by indicating the efficient IPOs with efficiency scores equal to 1 ( )ˆi.e. 1φ = . 
Respectively, the inefficient IPOs assume scores of ˆ0 1φ≤ < .   
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As a further step, we apply the latest developments by Bădin et al. (2012). In this regard, we 
need to create ratios of conditional to unconditional efficiency scores as:  
(17)     
( )
( )
0 0 0
0 0
ˆ ,
ˆ
ˆ ,
e b m
Q
e b
φ
φ
=  
Then, by using a nonparametric regression we are able to analyze the behavior of Qˆ  as a 
function of lobby and PAC money. Let the nonparametric regression smoothing be presented as: 
(18)      ( ) , 1,..., ,i i iQ g M i nε= + =                            
 where 
i
ε is the error term with ( ) 0i iE Mε = , and g is the mean regression function, since 
( ) ( )i i iE Q M g M= .  In order to estimate the regression function, we follow Jeong et al. (2010) and 
apply a local linear estimator which is less sensitive to edge effects. Then, the presentation of three-
dimensional pictures will reveal the combined effect of lobby and PAC money on IPOs’ efficiency 
levels. An increasing nonparametric regression will indicate a positive effect; a decreasing one a 
negative effect. Overall, the adoption of the fully nonparametric approach offers two main 
advantages. First, it does not impose any prior assumptions on the functional forms of the examined 
relationships and, secondly, it enables us to reveal any nonlinear relationships. 
 
IV. Empirical results 
Figure 3 presents the empirical frontiers for the offer price versus closing price based on the 
two samples under the CRS and VRS assumptions. In particular, subfigure 3a indicates the 
empirical frontiers for the full sample (i.e. including overpriced IPOs, N=379); the straight solid 
(dashed) line represents the empirical frontier under the CRS (VRS) assumption. As expected, 
overpriced firms have higher efficiency scores and lie on the two frontiers9. Since the assumption of 
                                                 
9
An IPO which is efficient under the CRS assumption is also efficient under the VRS assumption. However, an IPO 
efficient under the VRS assumption may not be efficient under the CRS assumption. 
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CRS has higher discriminative power than VRS, fewer IPOs are on the CRS frontier. Conversely, 
under the VRS assumption, we account for scale and heterogeneity effects. As a consequence, more 
IPOs are deemed efficient and lie on the frontier10. Subfigure 3b illustrates the empirical frontiers 
when overpriced IPOs are eliminated from the sample (N=317). The slope of the CRS frontier 
becomes considerably smaller compared to the previous CRS frontier (subfigure 3a, which includes 
overpriced IPOs).11 Moreover, in this case, we observe that more IPOs lie on both the CRS and 
VRS frontiers. This, again, is attributed to the exclusion of the overpriced IPOs. Since in our 
analysis the minimization of underpricing suggests efficiency, the overpriced IPOs envelope the 
performance of the other IPOs and are always deemed efficient.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
The CRS frontier is more robust compared to the VRS frontier and, therefore, fewer IPOs under the CRS assumption 
are deemed efficient. 
11
Since in our analysis efficiency is represented by the minimization of IPO underpricing, overpriced IPOs will always 
be efficient and shape the efficient frontier under both the CRS and VRS assumptions. 
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Figure 3 
Graphical representation of the empirical frontiers 
Subfigure 3a presents the estimated empirical frontier for all 379 IPOs in our sample. Subfigure 3b presents the 
empirical frontier for the 317 IPOs (i.e. we have excluded the overpriced IPOs). The solid line indicates the 
empirical frontier under the CRS assumption, whereas the dashed line indicates the empirical frontier under the 
VRS assumption.  
 
a  
b  
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Assessing unconditional efficiency estimates12 from the full sample, we find that 233 out of 
the 379 IPOs have efficiency scores above the sample mean (0.706) in the CRS regime. However, 
under VRS, 222 out of the 379 IPOs exceed the average efficiency score (0.770). Table 2 presents 
the top and lowest 30 performers under the two regimes. The mean efficiency score of the top group 
under CRS is 0.8426, whereas under VRS it becomes 0.9556. Furthermore, under CRS, only 1 
company is deemed to be efficient; under VRS 6 IPOs have an efficiency score equal to 1. The top 
30 performers represent 9 different sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Consumer Staples, 
Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials, 
Telecommunications). Among these companies, 11 have donated both lobby and PAC money. 
Looking at the lowest 30 performers, the mean efficiency score under CRS (VRS) is 0.3804 
(0.459). Notably, the majority of these issuers operate in the “High Technology” sector. In this 
respect, our findings complement evidence by Lowry and Schwert (2002) suggesting that high-
technology firms tend to experience higher first-day returns. From our efficiency point of view, 
because such issuers increase the underpricing effect, they significantly impair their efficiency 
levels. Finally, we note that these 30 IPOs have mostly donated lobby and not PAC money. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
As has been pointed by Bădin et al. (2012) and Mastromarco and Simar (2014), it is not meaningful to examine the 
classification of decision making units (DMUs) using conditional efficiency estimates since they are obtained 
accounting directly for the effect of the exogenous variables. Consequently, we present the original efficiency scores. 
However, all the results obtained are available on request.  
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Table 2 
Efficiency analysis- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the full sample (N=379) in terms of their ability to minimize 
underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their efficiency performance under the VRS assumption in order to 
account for differences between sectors. When an IPO is efficient (i.e. efficiency score equal to 1.000) under the 
CRS assumption, it is also efficient under the VRS assumption. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector 
alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. The main descriptive statistics for the efficiency estimates, 
lobby and PAC amounts are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker CRS VRS Lobby Money PAC Money Sector 
07/29/2014 ContraFect Corp CFRXU 0.9249 1.0000 20000 0 Healthcare 
04/12/2012 Oaktree Capital Group  OAK 0.8147 1.0000 260000 0 Financials 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics  TSRX 0.8031 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies  ICXT 1.0000 1.0000 1420000 85000 High Technology 
08/19/2004 Google  GOOG 0.6803 1.0000 180000 0 High Technology 
07/20/1999 Genentech  DNA 0.6134 1.0000 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
05/10/2013 BioAmber  BIOA 0.9561 0.9828 80000 0 Materials 
07/24/2014 Pfenex  PFNX 0.9092 0.9807 180000 0 Healthcare 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare  ADUS 0.9460 0.9715 40000 0 Healthcare 
05/18/2012 Facebook  FB 0.7983 0.9694 1350000 270000 High Technology 
02/03/2004 TRW Automotive Holdings  TRW 0.8298 0.9647 0 675000 Industrials 
04/10/2014 Ally Financial  ALLY 0.8373 0.9552 2110000 0 Financials 
05/05/2005 Lazard  LAZ 0.8366 0.9545 290000 0 Financials 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings  VG 0.9194 0.9536 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
07/30/1999 Biopure  BPUR 0.9402 0.9526 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods  KFT 0.8031 0.9512 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review  REVU 0.9299 0.9470 60000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
10/08/2009 Omeros  OMER 0.9200 0.9427 60000 0 Healthcare 
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals  ADMS 0.9172 0.9379 10000 0 Healthcare 
05/09/2013 Quintiles Transnational Q 0.7629 0.9358 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
02/10/2012 Homestreet  HMST 0.7362 0.9349 5000 2350 Financials 
03/08/2007 Clearwire  CLWR 0.8155 0.9343 80000 0 High Technology 
04/23/2008 American Water Works  AWK 0.8382 0.9314 300000 100000 Energy and Power 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.8517 0.9305 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/18/2010 General Motors  GM 0.7752 0.9294 9570000 284500 Industrials 
11/17/2011 Delphi Automotive  DLPH 0.8284 0.9263 396429 40500 Industrials 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy  CNX 0.9018 0.9259 550000 226250 Materials 
03/09/2011 HCA Holdings  HCA 0.7767 0.9200 200000 268250 Healthcare 
02/11/2011 Kinder Morgan  KMI 0.7760 0.9193 190000 0 Energy and Power 
12/13/2013 Cheniere Energy Partners  CQH 0.8357 0.9165 2630000 201800 Energy and Power 
 mean  0.8426 0.9556 732,880.9667 78,938.3333  
 std  0.0860 0.0284 1,793,480.2481 147,547.0496  
 min  0.6134 0.9165 0.0000 0.0000  
 max  1.0000 1.0000 9,570,000.0000 675,000.0000  
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics  SAGE 0.4803 0.5666 70000 0 Healthcare 
06/22/1999 Ramp Networks  RAMP 0.5274 0.5622 20000 0 High Technology 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange  ISE 0.4755 0.5618 0 6000 Financials 
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06/17/1998 software.net  SWNT 0.5455 0.5499 20000 0 High Technology 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals  AGIO 0.4622 0.5480 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/13/2012 SolarCity  SCTY 0.5450 0.5475 230000 2000 Industrials 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems  OESX 0.4877 0.5457 100000 0 Industrials 
07/20/2011 Zillow  Z 0.4490 0.5413 40000 0 High Technology 
05/29/2014 Resonant  RESN 0.5295 0.5409 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye  FEYE 0.4462 0.5382 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group  ISSX 0.4376 0.5345 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign  VRSN 0.4409 0.5079 60000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets  FMKT 0.1377 0.4948 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine  FMI 0.4089 0.4923 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth  ATHN 0.4072 0.4904 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis  CORV 0.3413 0.4886 40000 0 Telecommunications 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding  ISIL 0.3718 0.4862 80000 0 High Technology 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM  MPPP 0.3552 0.4814 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications  WJCI 0.3984 0.4743 0 1500 High Technology 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences  KIN 0.4704 0.4723 1940000 0 Healthcare 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink  DTHK 0.3877 0.4551 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod  EYES 0.3619 0.3999 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com  DSCM 0.2877 0.3696 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies  ENGA 0.2938 0.3595 20000 0 High Technology 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.2793 0.3411 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections  RTHM 0.2440 0.3366 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com  BCST 0.2304 0.3117 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com  MCAF 0.2190 0.2717 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com  PCLN 0.1862 0.2569 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon  HLTH 0.2047 0.2429 30000 0 Healthcare 
 mean  0.3804 0.4590 117,866.6667 316.6667  
 std  0.1152 0.1005 347,410.0959 1,163.2545  
 min  0.1377 0.2429 0.0000 0.0000  
 max  0.5455 0.5666 1,940,000.0000 6,000.0000  
 
Similarly, Table 3 presents the top and lowest 30 IPOs from the reduced sample (excluding 
overpriced IPOs, N=317). Under the VRS assumption, all IPOs lie on the VRS frontier and exhibit 
an efficiency score of 1. Under CRS, only 3 IPOs are deemed inefficient with the majority of the 
top performers lying on the CRS frontier. This group comprises 9 sectors (Consumer Staples, 
Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials, Media and 
Entertainment and Telecommunications) which appear almost identical to those featured in the full 
sample. Under the CRS (VRS) assumption, the lowest 30 IPOs have a mean efficiency score of 
0.4653 (0.4877). The majority of these issuers come from the ‘High Technology’ sector, 
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corroborating our previous findings13. Again, we observe that among the top performers 10 out of 
30 companies have donated PAC money. The respective proportion for the lowest group is only 4 
out of 30. This provides further evidence that IPOs with limited underpricing tend to rely on PAC 
campaigns. However, it should be emphasized that the top performers in the reduced sample include 
fewer companies which combine lobbying and PAC compared to the full sample. This, in turn, 
suggests that it is mainly the overpriced IPOs that employ both contribution types. 
 
Table 3 
Efficiency analysis- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers 
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the reduced sample (317 underpriced IPOs) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their efficiency performance under the VRS assumption in 
order to account for differences between sectors. When an IPO is efficient (i.e. efficiency score equal to 1.000) 
under the CRS assumption, it is also efficient under the VRS assumption. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s 
sector alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. The main descriptive statistics of the efficiency 
estimates, lobby and PAC amounts are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing Date Company Ticker CRS VRS 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
07/31/2014 Marinus Pharmaceuticals  MRNS 1.0000 1.0000 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences  KIN 1.0000 1.0000 1940000 0 Healthcare 
03/20/2013 Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals  TTPH 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
05/18/2012 Facebook  FB 0.9940 1.0000 1350000 270000 High Technology 
06/24/2011 KiOR  KIOR 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial  FRF 1.0000 1.0000 150000 0 Financials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding  ARX 1.0000 1.0000 8700 0 High Technology 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics  TSRX 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
04/22/2010 Codexis  CDXS 1.0000 1.0000 190000 0 Materials 
11/16/2007 Internet Brands  INET 1.0000 1.0000 80000 0 High Technology 
02/09/2007 VeriChip  CHIP 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Telecommunications 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial  NEWS 1.0000 1.0000 0 15000 Financials 
11/02/2005 Cbeyond Communications  CBEY 1.0000 1.0000 100000 0 Telecommunications 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings  ROC 1.0000 1.0000 140000 0 Materials 
06/14/2005 Premium Standard Farms  PORK 1.0000 1.0000 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
02/10/2005 Nasdaq Stock Market  NDAQ 1.0000 1.0000 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell  VIAC 1.0000 1.0000 20000 0 Healthcare 
08/19/2004 Google  GOOG 0.8471 1.0000 180000 0 High Technology 
08/05/2004 RightNow Technologies  RNOW 1.0000 1.0000 110000 0 High Technology 
07/30/2004 EnerSys  ENS 1.0000 1.0000 0 150000 High Technology 
05/24/2004 Genworth Financial  GNW 1.0000 1.0000 180000 0 Financials 
08/02/2001 Bunge  BG 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods  KFT 1.0000 1.0000 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
                                                 
13
 The majority of high performers within the reduced sample come from companies operating in the “High 
Technology” sector. This contradicts our previous findings. However, we identify the cause in the exclusion of 
overpriced IPOs. 
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03/15/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 1.0000 1.0000 220000 500 Industrials 
07/29/1999 Lennox International  LII 1.0000 1.0000 0 8000 Industrials 
07/28/1999 American Nat. Can Group CAN 1.0000 1.0000 0 7300 Materials 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies  ENGA 0.7638 1.0000 20000 0 High Technology 
07/22/1998 USEC  USU 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Materials 
05/27/1998 Capstar Broadcasting  CRB 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
05/11/1998 MGC Communications  MGCX 1.0000 1.0000 0 5500 Telecommunications 
  mean   0.9868 1.0000 
178,956.66
67 19,509.1667   
 std  0.0505 0.0000 
411,343.93
00 55,975.2033  
 min  0.7638 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   
1.0000 1.0000 
1,940,000.
0000 
270,000.000
0   
02/08/2007 Accuray  ARAY 0.6322 0.6322 200000 0 Healthcare 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com  PLRX 0.6154 0.6154 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems  OESX 0.6072 0.6072 100000 0 Industrials 
11/07/2013 Twitter  TWTR 0.5791 0.6040 90000 0 High Technology 
05/17/1999 Nextcard  NXCD 0.5970 0.5984 20000 0 Financials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics  SAGE 0.5980 0.5980 70000 0 Healthcare 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange  ISE 0.5921 0.5921 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings  ARMK 0.5858 0.5858 200000 2000 Retail 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals  AGIO 0.5754 0.5756 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow  Z 0.5591 0.5615 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye  FEYE 0.5556 0.5580 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group  ISSX 0.5448 0.5552 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign  VRSN 0.5490 0.5490 60000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine  FMI 0.5092 0.5112 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth  ATHN 0.5070 0.5091 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding  ISIL 0.4630 0.5007 80000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications  WJCI 0.4961 0.4967 0 1500 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets  FMKT 0.1714 0.4948 80000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
07/27/2000 Corvis  CORV 0.4249 0.4919 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM  MPPP 0.4423 0.4914 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink  DTHK 0.4828 0.4828 40000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod  EYES 0.4507 0.4507 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com  DSCM 0.3582 0.3822 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Genentech  DNA 0.3659 0.3741 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online TMCS 0.3478 0.3542 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections  RTHM 0.3038 0.3421 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com  BCST 0.2869 0.3183 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com  MCAF 0.2727 0.2832 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com  PCLN 0.2319 0.2611 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon  HLTH 0.2549 0.2550 30000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.4653 0.4877 
94,866.666
7 483.3333   
 std  0.1331 0.1142 
185,565.81
38 1,441.2838  
 min  0.1714 0.2550 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6322 0.6322 
1,040,000.
0000 6,000.0000   
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Conceivably, setting off to analyze the differential effect of lobbying and PAC on IPO 
performance is a meaningful endeavour only to the extent that the above efficiency scores would 
differ in the absence of either type of expenditure. To elucidate the association with the issuer’s 
ability to minimize underpricing, we conduct the bootstrap-based nonparametric test proposed by Li 
et al. (2009) and report the results in Table 414. The upper part of the table engages the full sample 
for the CRS and VRS assumptions. With 
( )f ⋅
 and 
( )g ⋅
denoting the density functions of 
unconditional and conditional efficiency estimates, respectively, contributions are shown to produce 
an effect that fulfils all conventional levels of significance. The lower part extends this analysis to 
the reduced sample and corroborates further the relationship. Evidently, lobby and PAC money alter 
issuers’ ability to evaluate IPOs and this reflects upon the estimated efficiency levels. Given the 
strength of the association, we can now turn to disentangling the effect by donation type and 
investigate the optimal appropriation of an issuer’s political budget. 
 
 
Table 4 
Kernel consistent density equality tests 
We implement a consistent integrated squared differences test for the equality of densities of conditional and 
unconditional efficiencies under the CRS and VRS assumptions in the full and reduced IPO samples. Following 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), we trim the DEA-estimates from values equal to unity and conduct the Li et al. 
(2009) test applying the least-squares cross validation criterion and bootstrap methods for the null distribution 
of the statistic (1,000 replications have been applied).  
 
 
Full sample (including overpriced IPOs)  
  Test Statistic  p-value 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
1
:
:
H f CRS g CRS M
H f CRS g CRS M
=
≠
 
286.2809 0.0000 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
1
:
:
H f VRS g VRS M
H f VRS g VRS M
=
≠
 
175.7127 0.0000 
                                                 
14
 Following Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), we trim the estimates that are equal to unity (Algorithm I) and perform the 
bootstrap Li et al. (2009) test. Hence, our results are unaffected by sampling variation or noise from the DEA 
estimation. 
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Reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs)  
  Test Statistic  p-value 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
1
:
:
H f CRS g CRS M
H f CRS g CRS M
=
≠
 
226.1246    0.0000 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
1
:
:
H f VRS g VRS M
H f VRS g VRS M
=
≠
 
131.1409    0.0000 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates graphically the effect of lobby and PAC contributions on IPO efficiency 
levels as surfaces in a three-dimensional space (c.f. Bădin et al. (2012)). Drawing evidence from the 
full sample (N=379 IPOs), subfigures “a”, “c”, “e” and “g” present the results from the 
nonparametric regression analysis under the CRS assumption; subfigures “b”, “d”, “f” and “h” 
portray the respective findings under VRS15. Subfigure “a” reveals a nonlinear relationship between 
lobbying and IPO performance, resembling an inverted “U”-shape. For lower levels of lobbying 
money, the effect on efficiency is positive up to a certain threshold value. Beyond that point a 
negative association arises, indicated by a downwards slopping nonparametric regression line. An 
inverted “U”-shape relationship16 is also evident in VRS (subfigure “b”). In the case of PAC, we 
observe an increasing nonlinear nonparametric regression line (subfigure “a”), showing a positive 
influence on IPO efficiency levels. Under VRS, the effect is more pronounced, indicated by a 
steeper increasing nonparametric regression line. Modifying further our sampling to account for an 
issuer’s particular economic sector, new interesting patterns emerge. 
                                                 
15
 Subfigures “a” and “b” present the effect of lobby and PAC money for all IPOs of the full sample. The rest subfigures 
illustrate the effect based on sub-sampling analysis for three sectors (Financials, Energy and Power and Industrials). 
The choice is based on the fact that the highest levels of donations for lobby and PAC money come from companies 
operating in these sectors (see also Figure 1).  
16
 Since the CRS measurement has a higher discriminative power than VRS, the examined effects in some cases may be 
more emphatic under the CRS assumption.  
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Indeed, focusing on IPOs from the “Energy and Power” sector, we observe that the effects 
are not uniform. Under both CRS (subfigure “c”) and VRS (subfigure “d”), PAC donations have a 
nonlinear negative effect on efficiency levels. However, lobby money appears to exert a highly 
positive influence. In both cases, the nonlinearities suggest that companies operating in this sector 
are better off with lobbying rather than PAC expenditure. In the Financial sector, under the CRS 
assumption (subfigure “e”) lobbying has a “U”-shape association with efficiency level, whereas 
PAC accounts for a positive effect, indicated by a nonlinear increasing nonparametric regression 
line. However, when we assume VRS (subfigure “f”), the effect of lobbying turns to neutral, while 
the effect of PAC exhibits a light form of an inverted “U”-shape relationship. Therefore, the 
influence of the exogenous factors is also attributable to scale effects17. Accordingly, lobby and 
PAC contributions may have different implications for larger companies in the sector compared to 
smaller ones. Finally, the Industrial sector, under both CRS (subfigure “g”) and VRS (subfigure 
“h”) reveals a positive effect for PAC contributions.18 However, lobbying gives rise to 
heterogeneous patterns. Specifically, the CRS assumption yields a negative effect, whereas under 
VRS there is a “U”-shape relationship, suggesting that when we account for offer price levels the 
effect can vary.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 In our case, the different size is attributed to differences in IPO offer price. 
18
 This positive effect is more pronounced under CRS. 
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Figure 4 
The effect of lobby and PAC money on IPO performance (full sample-379 IPOs): 
Nonparametric regression 
The three-dimensional graphs represent the results of local constant estimators indicating the effect of PAC and 
lobby money on IPO performance (efficiency). These regressions apply for bandwidth selection the least-squares 
cross validation criterion. The vertical axes indicate the ratio of conditional to unconditional measures, whereas 
the horizontal axes represent the amounts of lobby and PAC money donated by IPO firms. Subfigures 4a, 4c, 4e 
and 4g illustrate the effect of lobby and PAC money under the CRS assumption, and subfigures 4b, 4d, 4f and 4h 
show the effect under the VRS assumption.   
 
a  b  
c  d  
e  f  
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g  h  
 
 
 In a similar approach, Figure 5 describes the effect of lobby and PAC on IPO efficiency 
based on the reduced sample (N=317). Subfigures “a” and “b” present the overall results. Under 
CRS, lobbying produces a “U”-shape relationship, whereas under VRS the association becomes 
negative. This suggests that scale effects can drastically alter the impact on issuers’ efficiency. 
Conversely, the overall PAC effect remains positive under both assumptions, indicated by an 
increasing nonlinear regression line. This is consistent with the full sample results which are proven 
robust to the inclusion/exclusion of overpriced IPOs.  
Drawing separate evidence from the Energy and Power sector, we observe that political 
expenditure exerts a similar influence under both CRS (subfigure “c”) and VRS (subfigure “d”). In 
particular, lobby money has a nonlinear positive effect on IPO efficiency levels, whereas PAC has a 
nonlinear negative effect. The Financial sector (subfigure “f”) demonstrates that under VRS the 
effects of both lobby and PAC money are almost identical with those previously examined for the 
full sample. However, under CRS (subfigure “e”) lobbying gives rise to an inverted “U”-shape, 
whereas previously it formed a “U”-shape. In this case, the lobbying influence remains conditional 
on sampling and implies that the CRS assumption in some industries may be unrealistic. Finally, 
subfigure “g” engages firms operating in the Industrial sector. In overall terms, the results are robust 
since they agree with our earlier evidence, suggesting a negative association with lobbying and a 
positive one with PAC money. In addition, under the assumption of VRS (subfigure “h”) the effect 
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of PAC money is positive as it has also been for the full sample; however, lobbying leads to a “U”-
shape relationship, suggesting a negative effect for lower levels of lobbying contributions and a 
positive effect for higher levels. This contradicts our previous findings which portrayed a 
monotonically negative effect for lobbying. Once again, the assumption of VRS does not produce 
robust results.  
Conclusively, the evidence from both samples converges on the positive influence of PAC; 
the dollar intensity of these campaigns tends to constrain underpricing. Given that IPO firms 
channel significantly larger amounts towards lobbying than PAC, our findings suggest that the 
effects of such donations are not deterministic to IPO performance and depend heavily on the 
particular sectors that the companies operate in. Likewise, scale effects can determine the effect of 
lobby and PAC money on IPO efficiency levels. Invariably, the relationships are highly nonlinear, 
justifying our fully nonparametric treatment.   
 
Figure 5 
The effect of lobby and PAC money on IPO performance (reduced sample-317 IPOs): 
Nonparametric regression 
The three-dimensional graphs represent the results of local constant estimators indicating the effect of PAC and 
lobby money on IPO performance (efficiency). These regressions apply for bandwidth selection the least-squares 
cross validation criterion. The vertical axes indicate the ratio of conditional to unconditional measures, whereas 
the horizontal axes represent the amounts of lobby and PAC money donated by IPO firms. Subfigures 4a, 4c, 4e 
and 4g illustrate the effect of lobby and PAC money under the CRS assumption, and subfigures 4b, 4d, 4f and 4h 
show the effect under the VRS assumption.   
 
 
a  b  
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c  d  
e  f  
g  h  
 
 
V. Discussion 
  Overall, our results show that IPOs with reduced underpricing tend to come from companies 
which have employed PAC campaigns and that companies with overpriced IPOs are mainly those 
that donate both lobby and PAC money. There is a nonlinear relationship between lobby money and 
IPO performance (the inverted “U”-shape).  
PAC contributions produce a robustly positive effect across both full and reduced samples; 
the inclusion/exclusion of overpriced IPOs does not alter the effect of PAC money. This is apparent 
in the IPOs of Industrial firms (where, in contrast, the influence of lobbying assumes a variety of 
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patterns). Non-coincidentally, this sector includes industries known for their high political 
expenditure such as transport equipment and defense system manufacturers, for which historically 
the U.S. government is the single most influential buyer.19 
Lobbying, as a message-oriented activity, lends itself to circumstances where the elements 
of communication and timely interactions with legislators are crucial. The Energy and Power sector, 
which is extensively regulated, illustrates this notion by a decisive advantage for lobbying IPOs. 
Commonly under public scrutiny for safety and environmental concerns, these firms must produce 
compelling arguments about the way that their operations affect other stakeholders - especially if, as 
noted by Milyo (2001), an incumbent’s objective function revolves around the issues of re-election, 
career progression within Congress and ideology promotion. Where discontent is caused among a 
candidate's constituents, a firm not only depletes its political capital but may also trigger enactment 
of constraining legislation. 
For the Financial sector, however, the analysis reveals patterns which lack robustness as 
well as a definite direction. This is intriguing, given the large amounts that many of these firms 
spend20, the complex institutional framework and the massive assistance which the federal 
government has provided during periods of turbulence. The idiosyncrasy of financial organizations 
may account for the blurred effect. Notwithstanding the high degree of regulation and frequent 
government intervention, operators in this sector are not as dependent on political favoritism for the 
success of their businesses as is the case, for example, with regulated industries from the Industrial 
sector. Financial institutions are essential to economic activity and exert de facto political influence. 
 
                                                 
19
  IBISWorld reports that in 2013, the top contributing defence and aerospace firms had 56.1% of turnover coming 
from federal contracts, while in some cases the figure is around 90%. 
20
 Approximately 16.5% of total political expenditure over the last five years, though because this sector mainly 
comprises large businesses, political expenditure is not a large proportion of each company’s expenditure. 
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VI. Additional robustness tests 
The DEA estimators (described by equations 12 and 13) measure IPO efficiency relative to an 
estimate of an unobserved true frontier. Consequently, remaining conditional on the sample from an 
underlying data-generating process (DGP), these estimators are biased by construction. In our 
setting, the magnitude of the bias can be computed as: 
(19)   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , ,CRS CRS CRSBIAS e b E e b e bφ φ φ= −  
(20)   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , .VRS VRS VRSBIAS e b E e b e bφ φ φ= −      
   
Then, the bootstrap bias estimate of the original estimators under the CRS and VRS assumptions 
corresponds to the empirical analog of equations (14) and (15): 
(21)   ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2000
1 *
0 0 , 0 0 0 0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,
B
B CRS CRS b CRS
b
BIAS e b B e b e bφ φ φ
=∧
−
=
= −∑  
(22)   ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2000
1 *
0 0 , 0 0 0 0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , .
B
B VRS VRS b VRS
b
BIAS e b B e b e bφ φ φ
=∧
−
=
= −∑  
Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a,b) have proposed bootstrap methods for inference and bias 
correction of the original DEA estimates in order to improve accuracy. Accordingly, the bias-
corrected estimators under the CRS and VRS assumptions can be calculated as: 
(23)   
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0
2000
1 *
0 0 , 0 0
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
ˆ ˆ                  =2 , , ,
CRS CRS B CRS
B
CRS CRS b
b
e b e b BIAS e b
e b B e b
φ φ φ
φ φ
∧
=
−
=
= −
− ∑
 
(24)   
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0
2000
1 *
0 0 , 0 0
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,
ˆ ˆ                  =2 , , .
VRS VRS B VRS
B
VRS VRS b
b
e b e b BIAS e b
e b B e b
φ φ φ
φ φ
∧
=
−
=
= −
− ∑
 
The sample variance of the bootstrap values ( )* , 0 0ˆ ,CRS b e bφ , ( )
*
, 0 0
ˆ ,
VRS b
e bφ provides us with an 
estimate 2σˆ of the variance of ( )0 0ˆ ,CRS e bφ  and ( )0 0ˆ ,VRS e bφ : 
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(25)   ( ) ( )
2
2000 2000
2 1 * 1 *
, 0 0 , 0 0
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ , , ,
B B
CRS b CRS b
b b
B e b B e bσ φ φ
= =
− −
= =
 
= − 
 
∑ ∑  
(26)   ( ) ( )
2
2000 2000
2 1 * 1 *
, 0 0 , 0 0
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ , , .
B B
VRS b VRS b
b b
B e b B e bσ φ φ
= =
− −
= =
 
= − 
 
∑ ∑    
   
Finally, we can construct the confidence intervals of the two estimators using the empirical 
bootstrap distribution of the pseudo estimates * *, ,
ˆ ˆ, , 1,..., 2000
CRS b VRS b
bφ φ =  in order to find the interval 
values of ˆˆ  and b
α α
α . Then, the ( )1 α− percent confidence interval can be expressed as: 
(27)     ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆˆ, , , ,CRS CRS CRSe b e b e b bα αφ α φ φ+ ≤ ≤ +  
(28)   ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆˆ, , , .VRS VRS VRSe b e b e b bα αφ α φ φ+ ≤ ≤ +      
 
As per Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000b), we apply bootstrap-based inference algorithms for 
computing the bias-corrected efficiency estimates alongside with the 95% bootstrap confidence 
intervals. This allows us to capture any variations in the baseline results once the sample bias has 
been eliminated (Simar and Wilson (2000a)). Tables 5 and 6 report the new estimates under CRS 
and VRS, respectively, for the top and lowest 30 IPOs in the full sample (N=379), whereas Tables 7 
and 8 extend this analysis to the reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs, N= 317)21. In an 
important divergence from the figures presented in Tables 2 and 3, efficiency may not take the 
value of 1. Rather, the IPO performance is determined based on the bias-corrected efficiency score; 
the higher the estimate, the greater the performance.  
                                                 
21
 For our analysis we have applied 2,000 replications as suggested by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000b). Due to their 
large volume, these results are not tabulated. However, they are available upon request. Finally, for our bootstrap 
calculations, we acknowledge the use of the ‘FEAR’ – package which is integrated in the R-programming language 
(Wilson (2008)).  
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More closely, within the full sample and under the CRS assumption (Table 5), the highest 
performers comprise IPOs from 8 different sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Energy and 
Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials and Telecommunications). 
The lowest performing group also involves 8 sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Financials, 
Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Media and Entertainment, Retail and 
Telecommunications) with 'High Technology' accounting for the majority of the IPOs. On average, 
the top (lowest) 30 performers have a bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.8758 (0.3682). In a 
similar spirit to our previous analysis, 6 out of the 30 top performing companies have donated PAC 
money; the respective proportion for the lowest performers is only 2 out of 30.  
Under the VRS assumption (Table 6), the highest performing group includes IPOs from 10 
sectors (Financials, Energy and Power, Consumer Staples, Consumer Products and Services, 
Telecommunications, Real Estate, Materials, Industrials, High Technology and Healthcare). 
Appearing less diverse, the lowest performing group comprises 7 sectors (Consumer Products and 
Services, Telecommunications, Retail, Industrials, High Technology, Healthcare and Financials). 
The top (lowest) 30 performers have a mean value of bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9216 
(0.4389). Importantly, 11 of the top IPOs have been active in both lobbying and PAC. This comes 
in striking contrast to the bottom group whereby 1 company employs both contribution types out of 
a total of 3 PAC donors. Finally, the VRS regime confirms that the lowest efficiency levels come 
from companies in the High Technology sector.  
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Table 5 
Bootstrap efficiency analysis- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(CRS assumption) 
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the full sample (N=379) in terms of their ability to minimize 
underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the CRS assumption. High 
bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector 
alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we present the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of 
the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive 
statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
CRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies ICXT 0.9861 0.0139 0.0002 0.9583 0.9997 1420000 85000 High Technology 
05/10/2013 BioAmber BIOA 0.9428 0.0133 0.0001 0.9162 0.9558 80000 0 Materials 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare ADUS 0.9327 0.0132 0.0001 0.9064 0.9455 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/30/1999 Biopure BPUR 0.9271 0.0131 0.0001 0.9009 0.9399 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review REVU 0.9170 0.0129 0.0001 0.8911 0.9296 60000 0 Consumer Products and Services
07/29/2014 ContraFect CFRXU 0.9121 0.0128 0.0001 0.8863 0.9246 20000 0 Healthcare 
10/08/2009 Omeros OMER 0.9071 0.0128 0.0001 0.8815 0.9196 60000 0 Healthcare 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings VG 0.9067 0.0127 0.0001 0.8810 0.9191 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals ADMS 0.9045 0.0127 0.0001 0.8789 0.9169 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/24/2014 Pfenex PFNX 0.8964 0.0127 0.0001 0.8711 0.9087 180000 0 Healthcare 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy CNX 0.8891 0.0126 0.0001 0.8640 0.9014 550000 226250 Materials 
05/02/2014 SCYNEXIS SCYX 0.8799 0.0124 0.0001 0.8550 0.8920 40000 0 Healthcare 
09/29/2005 Avalon Pharmaceuticals AVRX 0.8763 0.0123 0.0001 0.8515 0.8883 120000 0 Healthcare 
06/27/2007 AuthenTec AUTH 0.8711 0.0123 0.0001 0.8465 0.8831 36000 0 High Technology 
02/05/2014 Genocea Biosciences GNCA 0.8639 0.0122 0.0001 0.8395 0.8758 110000 0 Healthcare 
10/12/2009 RailAmerica RA 0.8639 0.0122 0.0001 0.8395 0.8758 120000 51635 Industrials 
07/29/2010 Molycorp MCP 0.8629 0.0121 0.0001 0.8385 0.8747 290000 0 Materials 
07/25/2007 Rex Energy REXX 0.8600 0.0121 0.0001 0.8357 0.8718 80000 0 Energy and Power 
06/18/2010 Motricity MOTR 0.8553 0.0120 0.0001 0.8311 0.8670 40000 0 High Technology 
10/03/2012 LifeLock LOCK 0.8526 0.0120 0.0001 0.8285 0.8643 240000 0 High Technology 
11/15/2006 Emergent BioSolutions EBS 0.8461 0.0119 0.0001 0.8222 0.8577 2000000 300000 Healthcare 
10/25/2013 Endurance Intl Grp Hldg EIGI 0.8447 0.0119 0.0001 0.8208 0.8563 120000 0 High Technology 
05/15/2007 Continental Resources CLR 0.8424 0.0119 0.0001 0.8186 0.8539 60000 0 Energy and Power 
02/01/2012 US Silica Holdings SLCA 0.8415 0.0118 0.0001 0.8177 0.8530 20000 0 Materials 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.8397 0.0119 0.0001 0.8160 0.8513 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
10/04/2012 Berry Plastics Group BERY 0.8335 0.0118 0.0001 0.8099 0.8449 160000 0 Materials 
11/18/2011 Intermolecular IMI 0.8335 0.0118 0.0001 0.8099 0.8449 30000 0 High Technology 
05/15/2007 Pinnacle Gas Resources PINN 0.8297 0.0117 0.0001 0.8062 0.8411 20000 0 Energy and Power 
07/24/2013 Heat Biologics HTBX 0.8276 0.0116 0.0001 0.8042 0.8389 20000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/2011 Apollo Global Management APO 0.8268 0.0116 0.0001 0.8034 0.8381 932984 118100 Financials 
  mean   0.8758 0.0123 0.0001 0.8510 0.8878 257466.1333 31032.8333   
 std  0.0400 0.0006 0.0000 0.0389 0.0406 460060.5601 73961.0203  
 min  0.8268 0.0116 0.0001 0.8034 0.8381 10000.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9861 0.0139 0.0002 0.9583 0.9997 2000000.0000300000.0000   
12/15/2004 Las Vegas Sands LVS 0.4932 0.0070 0.0000 0.4793 0.5000 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.4873 0.0069 0.0000 0.4736 0.4940 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.4808 0.0068 0.0000 0.4672 0.4874 100000 0 Industrials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.4735 0.0067 0.0000 0.4601 0.4800 70000 0 Healthcare 
05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.4727 0.0067 0.0000 0.4593 0.4792 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.4689 0.0066 0.0000 0.4556 0.4753 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.4638 0.0066 0.0000 0.4507 0.4702 1940000 0 Healthcare 
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11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.4585 0.0065 0.0000 0.4455 0.4648 90000 0 High Technology 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.4556 0.0065 0.0000 0.4428 0.4619 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.4427 0.0063 0.0000 0.4302 0.4488 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.4398 0.0063 0.0000 0.4274 0.4459 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.4348 0.0061 0.0000 0.4225 0.4407 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.4314 0.0061 0.0000 0.4192 0.4373 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.4032 0.0057 0.0000 0.3918 0.4087 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.4015 0.0057 0.0000 0.3902 0.4071 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.3928 0.0056 0.0000 0.3817 0.3982 0 1500 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.3823 0.0054 0.0000 0.3715 0.3876 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.3666 0.0052 0.0000 0.3563 0.3717 80000 0 High Technology 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.3568 0.0051 0.0000 0.3468 0.3617 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.3501 0.0050 0.0000 0.3402 0.3549 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.3364 0.0048 0.0000 0.3269 0.3410 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies ENGA 0.2897 0.0041 0.0000 0.2815 0.2937 20000 0 High Technology 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.2835 0.0041 0.0000 0.2755 0.2874 140000 0 Retail 
12/03/1998Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.2754 0.0039 0.0000 0.2676 0.2792 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.2404 0.0035 0.0000 0.2337 0.2438 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2270 0.0033 0.0000 0.2206 0.2301 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2159 0.0031 0.0000 0.2098 0.2189 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2018 0.0029 0.0000 0.1961 0.2046 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.1836 0.0026 0.0000 0.1784 0.1861 80000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.1356 0.0020 0.0000 0.1318 0.1375 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services
  mean   0.3682 0.0052 0.0000 0.3578 0.3733 114200.0000 250.0000   
 std  0.1051 0.0015 0.0000 0.1022 0.1066 346576.6970 1119.9600  
 min  0.1356 0.0020 0.0000 0.1318 0.1375 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.4932 0.0070 0.0000 0.4793 0.5000 1940000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 6 
Bootstrap efficiency analysis- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers 
 (VRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the full sample (379 IPOs) in terms of their ability to minimize 
underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the VRS assumption in 
order to account for differences between sectors. High bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. 
Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we 
present the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals of the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its 
standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
VRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby Money PAC Money Sector 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies ICXT 0.9684 0.0316 0.0002 0.9440 0.9956 1420000 85000 High Technology 
05/10/2013 BioAmber BIOA 0.9553 0.0274 0.0003 0.9224 0.9792 80000 0 Materials 
02/03/2004 TRW Automotive Holdings TRW 0.9518 0.0128 0.0001 0.9301 0.9636 0 675000 Industrials 
04/10/2014 Ally Financial ALLY 0.9458 0.0093 0.0000 0.9295 0.9541 2110000 0 Financials 
04/12/2012 Oaktree Capital Group OAK 0.9455 0.0545 0.0008 0.9080 0.9902 260000 0 Financials 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare ADUS 0.9454 0.0261 0.0003 0.9131 0.9681 40000 0 Healthcare 
05/05/2005 Lazard LAZ 0.9453 0.0092 0.0000 0.9289 0.9536 290000 0 Financials 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings VG 0.9399 0.0136 0.0001 0.9202 0.9525 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
07/30/1999 Biopure BPUR 0.9324 0.0202 0.0002 0.9068 0.9497 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9321 0.0191 0.0002 0.9060 0.9499 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
05/18/2012 Facebook FB 0.9309 0.0385 0.0005 0.8973 0.9662 1350000 270000 High Technology 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review REVU 0.9263 0.0207 0.0002 0.9001 0.9441 60000 0 Consumer Products and Services
03/08/2007 Clearwire CLWR 0.9248 0.0095 0.0001 0.9077 0.9335 80000 0 High Technology 
04/23/2008 American Water Works AWK 0.9240 0.0073 0.0000 0.9115 0.9305 300000 100000 Energy and Power 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.9233 0.0072 0.0000 0.9110 0.9298 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals ADMS 0.9201 0.0177 0.0001 0.8981 0.9365 10000 0 Healthcare 
10/08/2009 Omeros OMER 0.9192 0.0235 0.0002 0.8887 0.9399 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/17/2011 Delphi Automotive DLPH 0.9188 0.0074 0.0000 0.9060 0.9253 396429 40500 Industrials 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy CNX 0.9099 0.0160 0.0001 0.8888 0.9247 550000 226250 Materials 
12/13/2013 Cheniere Energy Partners CQH 0.9093 0.0071 0.0000 0.8972 0.9156 2630000 201800 Energy and Power 
12/09/2004 Foundation Coal Holdings FCL 0.9041 0.0074 0.0000 0.8913 0.9106 0 74000 Materials 
11/18/2010 General Motors GM 0.9032 0.0262 0.0003 0.8748 0.9274 9570000 284500 Industrials 
03/29/2011 Apollo Global Management APO 0.9022 0.0073 0.0000 0.8896 0.9088 932984 118100 Financials 
03/09/2011 HCA Holdings HCA 0.9015 0.0185 0.0002 0.8762 0.9187 200000 268250 Healthcare 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9014 0.0081 0.0000 0.8874 0.9086 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
02/11/2011 Kinder Morgan KMI 0.9006 0.0186 0.0002 0.8753 0.9179 190000 0 Energy and Power 
06/10/2004 CB Richard Ellis Group CBG 0.8963 0.0072 0.0000 0.8839 0.9027 10000 0 Real Estate 
05/02/2014 SCYNEXIS SCYX 0.8908 0.0215 0.0002 0.8628 0.9096 40000 0 Healthcare 
02/01/2012 US Silica Holdings SLCA 0.8908 0.0096 0.0000 0.8751 0.8996 20000 0 Materials 
03/15/2012 Allison Transmission Hldg ALSN 0.8887 0.0082 0.0000 0.8745 0.8960 240000 0 Industrials 
  mean   0.9216 0.0170 0.0001 0.9002 0.9368 757480.4333 111096.6667   
 std  0.0215 0.0110 0.0002 0.0199 0.0267 1790773.6903 192603.8139  
 min  0.8887 0.0071 0.0000 0.8628 0.8960 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9684 0.0545 0.0008 0.9440 0.9956 9570000.0000 780000.0000   
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5562 0.0104 0.0001 0.5413 0.5658 70000 0 Healthcare 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5510 0.0107 0.0001 0.5360 0.5609 0 6000 Financials 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5487 0.0314 0.0003 0.5256 0.5756 90000 0 High Technology 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.5412 0.0044 0.0000 0.5336 0.5451 100000 0 Industrials 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5366 0.0114 0.0001 0.5213 0.5472 40000 0 Healthcare 
06/17/1998 software.net SWNT 0.5354 0.0145 0.0001 0.5218 0.5482 20000 0 High Technology 
12/13/2012 SolarCity SCTY 0.5338 0.0136 0.0001 0.5196 0.5459 230000 2000 Industrials 
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05/29/2014 Resonant RESN 0.5284 0.0125 0.0001 0.5120 0.5393 40000 0 High Technology 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5236 0.0176 0.0001 0.5062 0.5397 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5204 0.0178 0.0001 0.5030 0.5367 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5095 0.0249 0.0002 0.4895 0.5316 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5022 0.0057 0.0000 0.4922 0.5074 60000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.4768 0.0154 0.0001 0.4612 0.4911 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.4748 0.0156 0.0001 0.4592 0.4892 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4633 0.0110 0.0001 0.4495 0.4734 0 1500 High Technology 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.4601 0.0121 0.0000 0.4479 0.4708 1940000 0 Healthcare 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4554 0.0308 0.0003 0.4349 0.4810 80000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4477 0.0074 0.0000 0.4365 0.4546 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4448 0.0366 0.0004 0.4238 0.4777 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4212 0.0674 0.0010 0.4037 0.4811 40000 0 Telecommunications 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.3988 0.0960 0.0026 0.3821 0.4880 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.3967 0.0031 0.0000 0.3913 0.3995 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3479 0.0217 0.0001 0.3324 0.3660 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies ENGA 0.3418 0.0176 0.0001 0.3284 0.3571 20000 0 High Technology 
12/03/1998Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3252 0.0158 0.0001 0.3124 0.3392 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3072 0.0294 0.0003 0.2923 0.3340 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2881 0.0235 0.0002 0.2747 0.3093 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2568 0.0148 0.0001 0.2462 0.2693 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2376 0.0052 0.0000 0.2308 0.2423 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2344 0.0224 0.0002 0.2231 0.2548 80000 0 High Technology 
  mean   0.4389 0.0207 0.0002 0.4244 0.4574 120200.0000 316.6667   
 std  0.1020 0.0189 0.0005 0.1005 0.1012 346964.9093 1163.2545  
 min  0.2344 0.0031 0.0000 0.2231 0.2423 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.5562 0.0960 0.0026 0.5413 0.5756 1940000.0000 6000.0000   
 
 
Table 7 presents the bias-corrected results under the CRS assumption for the top and lowest 
30 IPOs of the reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs, N=317). With a slightly broader scope 
than the respective full sample group, the highest performers now include IPOs from 9 sectors 
(Consumer Staples, Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, 
Materials, Media and Entertainment and Telecommunications), whereas the group of the lowest 
performers comprises 8 sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Financials, Healthcare, High 
Technology, Industrials, Media and Entertainment, Retail and Telecommunications). In addition, 
the top 30 performers have a mean bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9993; the statistic for the 
lowest 30 is 0.4647. Again, PAC donors and companies that complement lobbying with PAC 
campaigns appear more likely to be listed within the top 30 rather than in the bottom group.  
 45
Under the VRS assumption (Table 8), the group of the highest performers includes IPOs 
from 10 sectors (Consumer Staples, Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, 
Industrials, Materials, Media and Entertainment, Retail and Telecommunications), whereas the 
bottom group is associated with 7 sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Financials, Healthcare, 
High Technology, Industrials, Retail, and Telecommunications). On average, the top 30 performers 
exhibit a bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9969; the lowest 30 a score of 0.4809. Invariably, the 
top group outnumbers the bottom one in firms donating PAC money with 12 and 4 IPOs, 
respectively. It becomes also evident that the lowest efficiency levels systematically relate to High 
Technology. Overall, the bias-corrected results for both samples and returns to scale assumptions 
lend strong support to our baseline findings. 
 
Table 7 
Bootstrap efficiency analysis- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(CRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the reduced sample (317 IPOs) in terms of their ability to minimize 
underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the CRS assumption. High 
bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector 
alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we present the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of 
the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive 
statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
CRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
07/31/2014 Marinus Pharmaceuticals MRNS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 1940000 0 Healthcare 
03/20/2013 Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals TTPH 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Healthcare 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics TSRX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/16/2007 Internet Brands INET 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 80000 0 High Technology 
02/09/2007 VeriChip CHIP 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Telecommunications 
08/05/2004 RightNow Technologies RNOW 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 110000 0 High Technology 
06/24/2011 KiOR KIOR 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial FRF 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 150000 0 Financials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding ARX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 8700 0 High Technology 
04/22/2010 Codexis CDXS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 190000 0 Materials 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial NEWS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 15000 Financials 
11/02/2005 Cbeyond Communications CBEY 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 100000 0 Telecommunications 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings ROC 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 140000 0 Materials 
06/14/2005 Premium Standard Farms PORK 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
02/10/2005 Nasdaq Stock Market NDAQ 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell VIAC 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 20000 0 Healthcare 
07/30/2004 EnerSys ENS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 150000 High Technology 
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05/24/2004 Genworth Financial GNW 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 180000 0 Financials 
08/02/2001 Bunge BG 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
03/15/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 220000 500 Industrials 
07/29/1999 Lennox International LII 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 8000 Industrials 
07/28/1999 American National Can Group CAN 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 7300 Materials 
07/22/1998 USEC USU 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Materials 
05/27/1998 Capstar Broadcasting CRB 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
05/11/1998 MGC Communications MGCX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 5500 Telecommunications 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9988 0.0007 0.0000 0.9971 0.9995 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
10/01/2014 Vivint Solar VSLR 0.9986 0.0007 0.0000 0.9969 0.9993 40000 0 Energy and Power 
05/28/2004 Alnylam Pharmaceuticals ALNY 0.9977 0.0006 0.0000 0.9960 0.9983 40000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.9993 0.0006 0.0000 0.9976 1.0000 163956.6667 36509.1667   
 std  0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 382799.2196 143574.3383  
 min  0.9977 0.0006 0.0000 0.9960 0.9983 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9994 0.0007 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 1940000.0000780000.0000   
12/15/2004 Las Vegas Sands LVS 0.6224 0.0004 0.0000 0.6213 0.6228 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.6149 0.0004 0.0000 0.6138 0.6153 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.6066 0.0005 0.0000 0.6056 0.6070 100000 0 Industrials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5976 0.0004 0.0000 0.5966 0.5980 70000 0 Healthcare 
05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.5966 0.0004 0.0000 0.5956 0.5970 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5917 0.0004 0.0000 0.5907 0.5921 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings ARMK 0.5853 0.0004 0.0000 0.5843 0.5857 200000 2000 Retail 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5786 0.0004 0.0000 0.5776 0.5790 90000 0 High Technology 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5750 0.0004 0.0000 0.5740 0.5754 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5587 0.0004 0.0000 0.5578 0.5591 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5551 0.0004 0.0000 0.5542 0.5555 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5487 0.0003 0.0000 0.5477 0.5490 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5445 0.0003 0.0000 0.5435 0.5448 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.5087 0.0004 0.0000 0.5078 0.5090 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.5067 0.0003 0.0000 0.5058 0.5070 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4958 0.0003 0.0000 0.4949 0.4961 0 1500 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4824 0.0003 0.0000 0.4815 0.4827 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4626 0.0003 0.0000 0.4618 0.4629 80000 0 High Technology 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.4503 0.0003 0.0000 0.4495 0.4506 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4419 0.0003 0.0000 0.4411 0.4422 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4246 0.0003 0.0000 0.4239 0.4249 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/20/1999 Genentech DNA 0.3655 0.0003 0.0000 0.3649 0.3658 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3580 0.0002 0.0000 0.3574 0.3582 140000 0 Retail 
12/03/1998Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3476 0.0002 0.0000 0.3470 0.3478 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3034 0.0003 0.0000 0.3029 0.3036 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2866 0.0002 0.0000 0.2861 0.2868 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2725 0.0002 0.0000 0.2720 0.2727 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2547 0.0002 0.0000 0.2543 0.2549 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2316 0.0002 0.0000 0.2312 0.2317 80000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.1713 0.0001 0.0000 0.1710 0.1714 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services
  mean   0.4647 0.0003 0.0000 0.4639 0.4650 90200.0000 483.3333   
 std  0.1327 0.0001 0.0000 0.1324 0.1327 184588.5266 1441.2838  
 min  0.1713 0.0001 0.0000 0.1710 0.1714 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6224 0.0005 0.0000 0.6213 0.6228 1040000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 8 
Bootstrap efficiency analysis- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(VRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the reduced sample (317 IPOs) in terms of their ability to minimize 
underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the VRS assumption in 
order to account for differences between sectors. High bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. 
Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also, we 
present the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its 
standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.  
  
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
VRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
07/28/1999 American National Can Group CAN 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9964 0.9999 0 7300 Materials 
05/11/1998 MGC Communications MGCX 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9964 0.9999 0 5500 Telecommunications 
07/29/1999 Lennox International LII 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9962 0.9999 0 8000 Industrials 
05/27/1998 Capstar Broadcasting CRB 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9962 0.9999 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
02/10/2005 Nasdaq Stock Market NDAQ 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell VIAC 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 20000 0 Healthcare 
08/02/2001 Bunge BG 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings ROC 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 140000 0 Materials 
05/24/2004 Genworth Financial GNW 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 180000 0 Financials 
06/24/2011 KiOR KIOR 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 120000 0 Energy and Power 
04/22/2010 Codexis CDXS 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 190000 0 Materials 
07/22/1998 USEC USU 0.9985 0.0015 0.0000 0.9954 0.9999 60000 0 Materials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding ARX 0.9983 0.0017 0.0000 0.9949 0.9999 8700 0 High Technology 
10/01/2014 Vivint Solar VSLR 0.9980 0.0013 0.0000 0.9955 0.9991 40000 0 Energy and Power 
06/14/2005 Premium Standard Farms PORK 0.9980 0.0020 0.0000 0.9938 0.9998 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
07/30/2004 EnerSys ENS 0.9980 0.0020 0.0000 0.9938 0.9998 0 150000 High Technology 
11/02/2005 Cbeyond Communications CBEY 0.9977 0.0023 0.0000 0.9930 0.9998 100000 0 Telecommunications 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9977 0.0018 0.0000 0.9941 0.9994 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial FRF 0.9970 0.0030 0.0000 0.9906 0.9998 150000 0 Financials 
05/22/2002 Liquidmetal Technologies LQMT 0.9967 0.0013 0.0000 0.9940 0.9979 120000 0 Materials 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial NEWS 0.9960 0.0040 0.0000 0.9872 0.9997 0 15000 Financials 
03/15/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 0.9960 0.0040 0.0000 0.9872 0.9997 220000 500 Industrials 
06/22/2011 Vanguard Health Systems VHS 0.9960 0.0012 0.0000 0.9935 0.9971 120000 123000 Healthcare 
12/11/2009 KAR Auction Services KAR 0.9952 0.0023 0.0000 0.9906 0.9973 53000 0 Retail 
05/23/2002 Eon Labs ELAB 0.9952 0.0014 0.0000 0.9925 0.9964 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/29/1999 Seminis SMNS 0.9947 0.0013 0.0000 0.9920 0.9959 20000 0 Consumer Staples 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9930 0.0070 0.0000 0.9828 0.9991 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
02/05/1998 Vysis (BP Amoco) VYSI 0.9927 0.0023 0.0000 0.9882 0.9948 3520000 172000 Healthcare 
02/02/2007 Molecular Insight Pharm MIPI 0.9921 0.0015 0.0000 0.9891 0.9935 105000 0 Healthcare 
07/31/2014 Marinus Pharmaceuticals MRNS 0.9906 0.0094 0.0001 0.9710 0.9996 40000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.9969 0.0022 0.0000 0.9926 0.9989 215556.6667 46342.5000   
 std  0.0023 0.0018 0.0000 0.0054 0.0017 651009.0151 145988.4131  
 min  0.9906 0.0012 0.0000 0.9710 0.9935 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9988 0.0094 0.0001 0.9964 0.9999 3520000.0000780000.0000   
02/08/2007 Accuray ARAY 0.6295 0.0027 0.0000 0.6250 0.6320 200000 0 Healthcare 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.6135 0.0018 0.0000 0.6103 0.6151 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.6061 0.0010 0.0000 0.6043 0.6070 100000 0 Industrials 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5968 0.0071 0.0000 0.5861 0.6032 90000 0 High Technology 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5945 0.0035 0.0000 0.5891 0.5977 70000 0 Healthcare 
05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.5928 0.0056 0.0000 0.5854 0.5977 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5884 0.0037 0.0000 0.5829 0.5917 0 6000 Financials 
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12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings Corp ARMK 0.5843 0.0014 0.0000 0.5815 0.5855 200000 2000 Retail 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5715 0.0041 0.0000 0.5655 0.5750 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5544 0.0071 0.0000 0.5457 0.5607 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5506 0.0074 0.0000 0.5420 0.5571 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5476 0.0014 0.0000 0.5450 0.5489 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5474 0.0077 0.0000 0.5374 0.5544 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.5049 0.0062 0.0000 0.4973 0.5105 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.5027 0.0063 0.0000 0.4950 0.5083 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4932 0.0074 0.0000 0.4809 0.4997 80000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4927 0.0040 0.0000 0.4873 0.4961 0 1500 High Technology 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4819 0.0095 0.0001 0.4650 0.4906 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4804 0.0023 0.0000 0.4766 0.4825 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4646 0.0273 0.0004 0.4304 0.4905 40000 0 Telecommunications 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.4505 0.0443 0.0017 0.4015 0.4936 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.4499 0.0007 0.0000 0.4487 0.4505 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3773 0.0049 0.0000 0.3692 0.3816 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Genentech DNA 0.3692 0.0049 0.0000 0.3624 0.3737 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
12/03/1998Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3491 0.0050 0.0000 0.3427 0.3536 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3337 0.0084 0.0000 0.3203 0.3416 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.3121 0.0061 0.0000 0.3013 0.3177 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2798 0.0034 0.0000 0.2748 0.2829 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2546 0.0064 0.0000 0.2444 0.2606 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2531 0.0019 0.0000 0.2504 0.2547 30000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.4809 0.0068 0.0001 0.4716 0.4872 94866.6667 483.3333   
 std  0.1147 0.0085 0.0003 0.1164 0.1142 185565.8138 1441.2838  
 min  0.2531 0.0007 0.0000 0.2444 0.2547 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6295 0.0443 0.0017 0.6250 0.6320 1040000.0000 6000.0000   
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Political connections formed via monetary contributions constitute a potentially powerful 
mechanism for reducing IPO underpricing. To evaluate this proposition, we require that the 
methodological tools in the pertinent literature be upgraded. Our contribution, in this respect, is 
twofold. First, we show how historical shortcomings of IPO performance assessment can be 
overcome through the application of a relative efficiency measure in a probabilistic framework. 
Having resolved the problem of comparability among IPO returns, we subsequently analyze the 
influence of lobbying and PAC contributions in a fully nonparametric manner.  
We find a robustly positive effect of PAC money on IPO efficiency levels whereas the effect 
of lobbying is more nuanced. Our sector analysis pinpoints circumstances under which 
contributions intensity can not only squander corporate cash but also impair efficiency levels. The 
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implications for prospective issuers are clear: political donations do not constitute a one-size-fits-all 
solution but can be effective when the distinct type of connectedness reinforces the firm’s position 
within its competitive environment, as with the lobbying contributions of Energy and Power firms. 
Overall, there are unique patterns for each economic sector but a common theme emerges in 
the important nonlinearities in the relationship of political contributions with IPO efficiency. On 
this basis, the nonparametric frontier analysis offers a decisive advantage by allowing the effects to 
unfold in an unbiased manner. Finally, although our interest here is in IPOs, the approach is more 
generally applicable in finance where relationships of influence are suspected. 
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